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Abstract
Intheexisting276internationalriverbasins,theincreaseinwatervariabilityprojectedbymostclimatechangescenarios
maypresentseriouschallengestoriparianstates.Thisresearchmapstheinstitutionalresiliencetowatervariabilityintrans-
boundary basins and combines it with both historic and projected variability regimes, with the objective of identifying
areasatpotentialriskoffuturehydropoliticaltension.Todoso,itcombsexistinginternationaltreatiesforsourcesofinsti-
tutionalresilienceandconsidersthecoefficientofvariationofrunoffasameasureofpastandfuturewatervariability.The
studyfindssignificantgapsinboththenumberofpeopleandareacoveredbyinstitutionalstipulationstodealwithvaria-
bility in South America and Asia. At present, high potential risk for hydropolitical tensions associated with water varia-
bility is identifiedin24 transboundary basinsand seems to beconcentratedmainlyinnorthernand sub-Saharan Africa.
By2050,areasatgreatestpotentialriskaremorespatiallydispersedandcanbefoundin61internationalbasins,andsome
of the potentially large impacts of climate change are projected to occur away from those areas currently under scrutiny.
Understandingwhenandwheretotargetcapacity-buildingintransboundaryriverbasinsforgreaterresiliencetochangeis
critical. This study represents a step toward facilitating these efforts and informing further qualitative and quantitative
research into the relationship between climate change, hydrological variability regimes, and institutional capacity for
accommodating variability.
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Introduction
Transcending political boundaries, river basins shared by
two or more countries pose particularly challenging man-
agement problems. In transboundary basins, the unify-
ing principles of integrated watershed management
clash with the forces of state sovereignty. While the inter-
dependence exemplified by sharing a river may result in
interstate conflict and dispute, it could likewise result in
cooperation (Elhance, 1999). To date, studies have shed
much light on this relationship considering how physi-
cal, economic, and political factors may affect conflict
and cooperation (e.g. Lowi, 1993; Hensel, Mitchell &
Sowers, 2006). In its most extreme form, the water–con-
flict relationship has been expressed in the water-wars
thesis (Starr, 1991). While the great majority of aca-
demic studies have criticized this alarmist claim as sensa-
tionalist at best (Wolf & Hamner, 2000), others have
challenged these more sobering and optimistic accounts
by speculating about the effects of climate change on
international water (Working Group II, n.d.).
Overall, climate change is expected to intensify secu-
rity concerns within or between countries or within river
basins (Nordås & Gleditsch, 2007; Gleick, 1993).
According to Barnett (2003: 9), climate change may
have indirect negative effects that can undermine the
legitimacy of governments, undermine individual and
collective economic livelihoods, and affect human health
through reduced availability of food and increased expo-
sure to new disease vectors. A report written by a group
of retired senior military officers attests that one of the
most destabilizing impacts from climate change will be
reduced access to freshwater, which could lead to conflict
in certain areas (CNA, 2007: 13–16). Pertaining to the
phenomenon of water variability, a 2008 Technical
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change has claimed that increased precipitation inten-
sity and variability is projected to increase the risks of
flooding and drought in many areas, which will affect
food stability as well as water infrastructure and practices
(Bates et al., 2008: 3–4).
As climatic variability around the world is expected to
change, the resilience of social-ecological systems in the
face of these shifts could be influenced by the existence
and make-up of international institutions. Resilience is
described here as the ability of a system to absorb pertur-
bations without altering the fundamental structure,
functions, and feedbacks of both its ecological and social
components (Adger et al., 2005; Walker et al., 2006).
Such ‘second-order resources’ enhance the abilities of
society to deal with environmental change (Ohlsson &
Turton, 2000). Formal management regimes governing
shared river basins, in the form of international water
treaties (including specific stipulations such as water allo-
cation, conflict resolution, and variability management)
and river basin organizations, can be particularly instru-
mental in managing or defusing likely disputes among
fellow riparians when faced with climatic change and
water variability (Drieschova, Giordano & Fischhendler,
2008). In their assessment of the Ganges Water Treaty,
for example, Salman & Uprety (2002: 177–186) find
that the 1996 Ganges River Treaty may have incorpo-
rated important stipulations such as water allocation yet
ignored others, including water augmentation (or varia-
bility management) and flood mitigation. Having little
recourse to deal with water variability has contributed
to political tensions between India and Bangladesh.
The study presented here aims to increase our under-
standing of the global distribution of treaties and the
institutional mechanisms they contain. This article uses
the geographical approach of risk-mapping based on the
vulnerability expressed by presence of treaties and river
basins organizations, juxtaposed with the respective
basin’s exposure to hydrological variability. The objec-
tive is to identify which basins may be ill-equipped to
deal with climatic change and water variability. Our
working assumption is that the existence of these treaty
stipulations and organizations will enhance resilience
specifically in river basins predicted to experience high
variability in the future.
With this mapping analysis we are then able to iden-
tify specific basins that may merit further study in light
of their potential risk of hydropolitical stress. The study
shows that institutional coverage is unevenly distributed
across continents and across basins. North America, Eur-
ope, and Africa have the highest coverage of spatial
extent, while South America and Asia have significant
gaps in both the number of people and the spatial extent
covered. The majority of high potential risk associated
with low institutional coverage and present water varia-
bility is found in northern and sub-Saharan Africa. Con-
sidering future water variability, our study suggests that
this high potential risk may also affect other areas of the
globe (e.g. in Central Asia or Eastern Europe), many of
which are currently not under scrutiny. By identifying
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efforts aimed at anticipating and addressing future
challenges in transboundary water management posed
by climate change.
The outline of this article is as follows. We briefly dis-
cuss the linkage between climate change, water variabil-
ity, and stability within international river basins. We
then review the institutional sources of resilience to cli-
mate change, particularly treaties, and the mechanisms
they embody, as well as river basin organizations that are
described in the literature and are considered in this
research. We then provide a brief description of the data
and methodology we used to classify and combine vul-
nerability and exposure to hazard. Next, the results of
a risk classification are presented along with basins that
merit further study due to their high potential risk levels.
We conclude by discussing the main findings of this
study and suggest further research.
Climate change, water variability, and stability
in international river basins
Climate change affects precipitation patterns and river
runoff, thus increasing the vulnerability of certain
regions and communities to changes in water availability
and hydrological extremes (Bates et al., 2008). The his-
torical records of many river basin flows suggest that sig-
nificant variability and changes in mean flows have
already been observed (Milly, Dunne & Vecchia,
2005; Milliman et al., 2008; Dai et al., 2009), and the
predicted effects of climate change may render future
river flow variability outside the bounds of previously
observed runoff events (IPCC, 2007: 31; Milly et al.,
2008). The IPCC notes thatas drought-affected areas are
projected to increase, adverse impacts on multiple sectors
(such as agriculture, water supply, energy production,
and health) will likewise rise. Increased flood risk will
also pose challenges to society pertaining to physical
infrastructure and water quality (IPCC, 2007: 49).
In international river basins, these direct and indirect
changes may alter current hydropolitical balances and
evidence suggests that the likelihood of political tensions
is related to the interaction between variability or rates of
change within a basin and the institutional capacity to
absorb that change (Wolf, Stahl & Macomber, 2003;
Stahl, 2005; Yoffe, Wolf & Giordano, 2003; Yoffe
et al., 2004). Consequently, regions and basins not gov-
erned by treaties or water-related institutions and facing
current and future variability may be more vulnerable to
tension and conflict. In regions that are already governed
by treaties, climate change and variability could affect the
ability of basin states to meet their water treaty
commitments and effectively manage transboundary
waters, especially if such treaties are not suited to dealing
with variability and new hydrological realities (Ansink &
Ruijs, 2008; Goulden, Conway & Persechino, 2009).
Variability may thus raise serious questions about the ade-
quacy of many existing transboundary arrangements, even
in areas that have exemplified cooperation in the past
(Cooley et al., 2009: 28).
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Given the links between climate change, water varia-
bility, conflict, and cooperation in international river
basins, the existence of institutions and river basin orga-
nizations seems paramount. Beyond the mere existence
of these institutions is their make-up and robustness.
Such institutional mechanisms may confer additional
resilience onto international treaties.
Institutional sources of resilience to
climate change
Recent research has found that while an international
water agreement may not necessarily prevent the emer-
gence of country grievances, these grievances usually
result in negotiations (or peaceful management) when
an agreement already governs the basin (Brochmann &
Hensel, 2009). Institutions such as international water
treaties can contribute to transparency, decrease the
transaction costs of cooperation, and clarify expectations
among the parties, thus stabilizing hydropolitical rela-
tions (McCaffrey, 2003: 157).
While a handful of empirical works have studied the
general phenomenon of water treaty signature (Espey
& Towfique, 2004; Song & Whittington, 2004; Tir
& Ackerman, 2009; Dinar, Dinar & Kurukulasuriya,
2011), less research has examined the institutional
components such treaties embody in a global context
(Stinnett & Tir, 2009). The presence (absence) of insti-
tutional stipulations may further reflect on the resilience
of treaties, given water variability and climatic change
(Gleick, 2010). The international relations and hydropo-
litics literature has shed insight into which mechanisms
could possibly enhance treaty resilience and cooperation.
Guided by the availability of global data as to the exis-
tence of particular stipulations and buttressed by existing
analysis in the literature, we consider the presence of (a)
water allocation mechanisms, (b) variability manage-
ment mechanisms, (c) conflict resolution mechanisms,
1 However, Dinar et al. (2010) demonstrate that variability can
motivate countries to set up new international agreements so as to
deal with changes in runoff and precipitation.
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to concentrate on only four major stipulations, we recog-
nize that additional stipulations may add to resilience.
Side-payments and issue-linkage, for example, may act
as a contract enforcing mechanism specifically in asym-
metric contexts (LeMarquand, 1977; Bennett, Ragland
& Yolles, 1998; Dinar, 2006). Our underlying assump-
tion is that the existence of these four institutional stipu-
lations provides a valid first approximation at the global
scale of the institutional resilience of transboundary
basins to present and climate-change induced water
variability. Below we discuss these four major compo-
nents. While these stipulations are quite distinct, insome
cases one single treaty provision can include information
on two different stipulations. For example, it is possible
that an allocation mechanism also includes specific stipu-
lations for variability management. In that case we will
consider the mere presence of an allocation mechanism
as one positive feature of the agreement, and the exis-
tence of explicit references to flow variability manage-
ment as another asset of the treaty.
Allocation mechanism
The presence of allocation mechanisms in agreements
pertaining to water quantity and even hydropower may
suppose greater certainty in the water sharing among
riparian countries (as opposed to allocation uncertainty),
which could be preferable in the context of climate
uncertainty. Drieschova, Giordano & Fischhendler
(2008), for example, enumerate a variety of stipulations
including direct and indirect allocation mechanisms and
general principles for allocation. Direct allocation
includes stipulations that divide specific water quantities
among the protagonists (see, for example, Cooley et al.,
2009). Indirect allocations can include such stipulations
as consultations or prioritization of uses, while general
principles can include stipulations such as equitable uti-
lization or needs-based approaches (Drieschova, Gior-
dano & Fischhendler, 2008; Wolf & Hamner, 2000).
Many of the above-cited authors seem to agree that in
light of climatic change, treaties that exhibit flexibility are
likely to be more suitable for dealing with water variabil-
ity. Nevertheless, the authors all seem to have slightly
different definitions of how flexibility may be operatio-
nalized in an international treaty.
Drieschova, Giordano & Fischhendler (2008) suggest
that a more flexible water allocation mechanism is one
that divides water by percentage (as opposed to fixed
amounts). Despite the advantages of this more flexible
mechanism, Drieschova, Giordano & Fishhendler
recognize that any direct allocation mechanism is
sometimes buttressed with additional indirect mechan-
isms that also have some built-in flexibility, because they
implicitly recognize that water availability may change
and therefore establish the process for which allocations
will be determined. McCaffrey (2003) argues that flex-
ible allocation mechanisms are those that recognize that
water allocations may have to be reduced due to water
availability in particular circumstances. Finally, Cooley
et al. (2009) emphasize allocations that specify that an
upstream riparian deliver a minimum flow to a down-
stream riparian and, like McCaffrey, praise mechanisms
that permit countries in specific situations to make up
owed water allocations in a future period when more
water is available.
Because treaties may include a range and combination
of stipulations that jointly achieve flexibility (in a context
of water variability), it is often difficult to assess agree-
ments for their flexibility in a uniform fashion. More-
over, the effectiveness of the particular allocation
mechanisms can vary widely due to the influence of local
context and hydrological regime, making it difficult to
establish a general rule on which specific allocation stipu-
lations are more suitable (relative to others) to deal with
water variability. For these reasons, we assume that it is
the general presence of allocation stipulations, as
opposed to treaties that neglect to codify any allocation
division at all, that may contribute to institutional resili-
ence of a basin in light of water variability.
Variability management
Variability management stipulations are designed to deal
with climatic extremes such as droughts and floods or
other specific variations. Such extreme events inflict
severe damage on the environment and populations
resulting in both tangible and intangible effects (Bakker,
2006). Variability thus increases the demand for infra-
structure development and the need to manage water
demand and supply (Global Water Partnership, 2000).
The mere existence of such stipulations implies that the
treaty parties not only acknowledge the temporal varia-
bility of water availability but may also better prepare
basin states to deal with extreme events.
The literature points to a number of specific treaty
mechanisms that enhance resilience to drought. Com-
bined with some of the allocation mechanisms discussed
above, authors have pointed to immediate consultations
between the respective states, stricter irrigation proce-
dures, water allocation adjustments, specific reservoir
releases, and data sharing (McCaffrey, 2003; Turton,
4 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 00(0)2003). Examples of treaties that have stipulated these
mechanisms in some form include the 1996 Ganges
River Agreement, the 1997 Cuareim River Agreement,
the 1970 Lake Lanoux Agreement, and the 1989 Vuoksi
River/Lake Saimaa Agreement.
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Pertaining to flood issues, the establishment of spe-
cific flood-control mechanisms is likewise important.
Examples of specific stipulations to mitigate floods
include transboundary warning systems, information
exchange, the construction of reservoirs and levees,
floodwalls, channelization, and the regulation of land use
(Rossi, Harmanciog ˘lu & Yevjevich, 1994). In her study
of transboundary flood and institutional capacity, Bak-
ker (2009) finds that, on average, death and displace-
ment tolls were lower in the basins with flood-related
institutional capacity (which included flood-related
treaty mechanisms).
Based on the above discussion, we expect that treaties
that stipulate specific variability management mechan-
isms (whether they are intended for drought or flood
mitigation), as opposed to those that don’t stipulate such
mechanisms, will bode better for treaty resilience, espe-
cially in the context of variability.
Conflict resolution
Conflict resolution mechanisms, such as third-party
involvement or arbitration, could prove invaluable, espe-
cially when there are conflicting interpretations of the
agreement or when the actions of one country are per-
ceived to negate the agreement’s conditions (Global
Water Partnership, 2000). Conflict resolution mechan-
isms also provide a forum for discussing resource and
environmental changes not envisioned in the treaty
(Drieschova, Giordano & Fishhendler, 2008). The
extent to which a treaty stipulates how disputes are to
be resolved among the parties relates to the level of con-
fidence the parties may have that their concerns will be
met in a fair and safe environment. The 1992 Agreement
between South Africa and Swaziland pertaining to the
Maputo and Incomati Basins, for example, stipulates
three stages of dispute resolution including direct nego-
tiations between the parties, an arbitral tribune, and a
United Nations appointed arbitrator.
As mentioned before, historically, extreme events of
conflict over water have been statistically somewhat more
frequent in regions characterized by high interannual
hydrologic variability. Therefore, the existence of
established conflict resolution mechanisms can be crucial
for assuaging tensions that may arise during extreme cli-
matic events and in a context of climate uncertainty.
River basin organizations
Joint commissions, governing councils, directorates, or
river basin organizations (which we herein refer to col-
lectively as RBOs) may also contribute to resilience.
According to Chasek, Downie & Brown (2006) regime
effectiveness may be at the heart of the success of trea-
ties and institutions. Effectiveness, according to Haas,
Keohane & Levy (1993), implies that there exists a
hospitable contractual environment (among other nec-
essary conditions). This environment, in turn, provides
states with the ability to negotiate with reasonable ease
and costs, comply with the treaty’s tenets without fear
that others are cheating or free-riding, monitor each
other’s behavior, and enforce decisions (see also Sus-
skind, 1994). Depending on their form and function,
RBOs can provide such a medium for achieving effec-
tiveness and an appropriate environment for facilitating
cooperation (Dombrowsky, 2007).
In addition to being mandated with implementing
any treaty obligations and proposing future water
plans, projects, and models (Cooley et al., 2009), the
RBO is often entrusted with a monitoring mandate
(e.g. 1995 Agreement over the Mekong River). Mon-
itoring stipulations are particularly important since
states often fear that fellow states to an agreement
may cheat or free-ride (Keohane & Martin, 1995).
A conflict resolution mandate, while more often dele-
gated to an external agency (see above), is sometimes
c o n s i g n e dt ot h eR B Oa tl e a s ta saf i r s tp h a s eo fd i s -
pute settlement (e.g. 1998 Agreement over the Zaru-
milla River). Enforcement mechanisms, when they are
directly present in a given water treaty, are also under-
taken by the RBO (e.g. a Governing Council in the
case of the 1973 Agreement between Brazil and Uru-
guay over the Parana River).
In her study of the Indus Basin, for example, Zawahri
(2009) finds that the joint commission established has
essentially played an invaluable role in the Indus Waters
Treaty’s implementation since 1960. According to
Zawahri, it is in large part due to the overwhelming suc-
cess of the joint commission to negotiate, monitor, and
manage the Indus regime that stable cooperation over
water has existed between the two riparians since the
treaty’s inception. Along the lines of this example, we
expect that basins equipped with a transboundary RBO
2 These treaty examples (and others provided further below) can be
located in the International Freshwater Treaties Database of the
Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD).
Stefano et al. 5will deal better with present and projected water
variability.
Methods, data, and analysis
This research followed a sequence of five steps to com-
bine institutional and climate-related information about
basin-country units. First, we refined the Transboundary
Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD; Yoffe, Ward
&Wolf, 2000) by increasing the spatial resolution from
river basin to basin-country unit (BCU) and populating
this database with a content analysis of all available trans-
boundary water treaties. We then categorized the vulner-
ability of each BCU by rating international water treaties
according to their potential resilience to hydrological
variability (based on the presence of the above stipula-
tions) and by the presence of a RBO. Next, we classified
exposure to hydrological variability based on the absolute
variability in the past and on the projected relative
change in hydrological variability for each BCU. We
then classified BCUs by combining maps of hydrological
exposure and vulnerability. Using these classifications,
we identified basins of significant interest for future
study due to their potential risk.
The basin-country unit spatial database
The TFDD contains tabular and spatial information on
276 transboundary freshwater river basins and more than
400 international, freshwater-related agreements world-
wide. Recent work expanded the breadth of the collec-
tion, adding 240 agreements to the database, as well as
its depth through a content analysis of over 40 dimen-
sions such as enforcement, conflict resolution, non-
water linkages, etc. Previously, all treaty data in the
TFDD were linked to basins and countries separately,
and part of this research involved shifting to the basin-
country unit for analysis. We define the basin-country
unit as the spatial portion of a basin that is within a single
country, such that, for example, the Chira basin shared
between Peru and Ecuador, is analyzed separately as the
Chira-Peru BCU and the Chira-Ecuador BCU. This res-
olution with a clear spatial reference of transboundary
agreements allows the identification of gaps in the spatial
extent of existing treaties. The combination of 276 trans-
boundary basins and 148 riparian countries yielded 747
BCUs covering a total of 61.962 million km
2 of the
earth’s surface and hosting a total of approximately
2.748 billion people.
To better represent the spatial extent of treaty docu-
ments, the concept of the territorial treaty application
was introduced and defined as the set of present-day
BCUs to which the treaty applies. This allowed water
agreements signed by colonial powers or nation-states
that no longer exist in their present configuration to be
mapped and analyzed consistently. Though the influ-
ence or existence of these countries may change in a
given place over time, agreements signed by these parties
may still influence water management in these areas, as
established under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. To determine the territorial treaty appli-
cation, treaties that referenced non-existent countries
were identified and then examined using a variety of data
sources on boundary delineations (Anderson, 2003) and
the political history of territorial change (Tir et al.,
1998).
Treaty and river basin organization capacity
We considered the capacity of each BCU to deal with
current and climate change-driven water variability by
recording five components that were then additively
combined to give the treaty-RBO score. The first com-
ponent is the presence of a treaty. Relevant treaties
included those with a focus on water as a scarce or con-
sumable resource, a quantity to be managed, or an eco-
system to be improved or maintained (Hamner &
Wolf, 1998). This kept the focus on mechanisms
directly related to management of water resources, and
resulted in 405 treaties being scored while 283 treaties
were excluded. Further scores are given for the presence
of water allocation mechanisms, flow variation manage-
ment provisions, and conflict resolution mechanisms.
In addition, a score was given to BCUs that had a river
basin organization or joint water management commis-
sion present (Table I). While data on the first four com-
ponents were obtained by using the TFDD database, for
the fifth component we consulted a number of sources
(official agreements, secondary literature, internet, and
contacts with international agencies) to find evidence
of the actual existence of RBOs. The final list of RBOs
was also cross-checked with the extant literature (e.g.
Dombrowsky, 2007; Wirkus & Boege 2005; and various
UNESCO-IHP publications such as Burchi & Spreij,
2003).
Once these attributes were evaluated, the final step
was to add them together for each BCU. One point was
given to a BCU for each treaty and RBO component
present on that BCU, provided the BCU had at least one
treaty present, resulting in a treaty-RBO score ranging
from zero to five. Finally this score was grouped into vul-
nerability levels for each BCU, with ‘low’ representing a
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a score of two or three, and ‘high’ representing a score of
zero or one. We quantified vulnerability in this way for
each of the 747 BCUs.
Exposure to hydrological variability and future change
For each BCU, we used the coefficient of variation (CV)
in annual runoff as the key hydrologic indicator of inter-
annual variability. CVs for the 1961–90 World Meteor-
ological Organization climate normal period, (referred to
as ‘present’) and for the time slice 2045–55 (‘2050’) were
derived for each BCU. The CV data were obtained from
the World Bank’s Water and Climate Change project
(World Bank, 2009). The historic runoff data were
simulated with the global hydrologic model CLIVAR
driven with historic climate data from 1961 to 1990.
The future projections of runoff were derived by driving
the same hydrological model with the climate data mod-
ified according to the precipitation and temperature
changes projected by Global Climate Models that
assumed the IPCC AR4 A1B emissions scenario. From
the many climate models available, only three models
were kept and available to this study. They span all
impact levels (‘wettest’, ‘middle’, and ‘driest’) based on
the change in a climate moisture index for each World
Bank Region.
We created two classifications of hydrological hazard
for each BCU, one based on the present variability and
one based on a combination with projected change in
variability by 2050. Following Vo ¨ro ¨smarty et al.
(2005), the absolute CVs characterizing the ‘present’
were grouped into three levels: ‘low’ (CV< 0.25),
‘medium’ (0.25   CV   0.75) and ‘high’ (CV >
0.75) variability. The relative change in variability was
calculated as the percent change from the present CV.
The ‘worst case’, that is, the largest relative (future)
change among the three available models was selected.
The future hazard level for a BCU was determined by
taking the present variability level and increasing it by
a step if the projected increase in variability was greater
than 15%. The one exception was when the present
hazard level was already high. In that case, the future
hazard level would remain high regardless of the level
of change in variability. Hazard levels were calculated for
only 735 BCUs because modeling constraints prevented
historic and future variability regimes from being simu-
lated for 12 small BCUs.
Combining treaty-RBO capacity with variability and
variability change
Following the definition of risk as a combination of
exposure to a hazard and vulnerability (e.g. Crichton,
1999), we defined potential risk levels by combining
the exposure to hydrological variability (hazard) with
the treaty-RBO score (vulnerability). The BCUs with
the highest risk are those with the lowest treaty-RBO
score (high vulnerability) and the greatest exposure to
hydrological variability (high hazard). An application of
this model is demonstrated in the online Methodology
Codebook.
As a final step, we identified basins that may deserve
further study by focusing on those BCUs with the high-
est present or future risk. To this group, we applied a fil-
ter that assessed the relative importance of each BCU to
Table I. Criteria used to evaluate treaties and river basin organizations
Criterion Description
Presence of a water treaty A formal agreement between sovereign nation-states substantively referring to
water as a scarce or consumable resource, a quantity to be managed, or an
ecosystem to be improved or maintained (Hamner & Wolf, 1998). Geo-
graphic scope must be specific enough to identify that, at minimum, the
treaty applies to all waters shared between signatories.
Water allocation Mechanisms for allocating water for water quantity and/or hydropower uses.
Variability management Mechanism(s) for facing flood and/or drought events or other specific variation
in flow.
Conflict resolution Mechanism(s) specified to address disagreements among the signatories,
including arbitration, diplomatic channels, a commission, third-party
involvement, and/or a permanent judicial organ.
River basin organization A bilateral or multilateral body of officials representing participating
governments in dialogue about or coordinated management of international
water bodies.
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the sub-basin, population, irrigation, or area. If a BCU
has a significant share of any of these elements, institu-
tional mechanisms to deal with variability appear more
relevant than in other BCUs with the same level of
potential risk but a small share of the basin. For instance,
pressure to improve institutional capacity may be higher
in densely populated areas as opposed to scarcely popu-
lated areas. Equations and terms used to implement this
filtering process can be found in the online Methodology
Codebook.
Results
Vulnerability: Treaty and river basin organization
capacity
The treaty-RBO scoring analysis of the 747 BCUs
yielded a variety of findings. Table II shows the number
of BCUs with at least one treaty-RBO component.
Beyond the presence of a water treaty, conflict resolu-
tion was the most frequent component while variability
management was the least frequent component globally.
The distribution of particular mechanisms by continent
shows some patterns in overall coverage as well as the
presence of specific mechanisms. Europe and North
America consistently emerged as having the highest pro-
portions of coverage, while South America and Asia
often had many BCUs without a particular mechanism.
RBO distributions differed slightly, but showed similar
patterns. The global distribution of treaty-RBO scores
by BCU is shown in Figure 1. Overall, almost half of the
BCUs in the world had a score of zero and those found in
Africa and Asia made up half of this group.
Breaking down the distribution of these different
scores in terms of the area covered and the population
affected in each continent (Figure 2) provided further
interesting insights and can be helpful towards an
assessment of their implications and importance. For
example, the percentages of total BCUs by region shown
in Figure 2a revealed that half of all African BCUs and
nearly two-thirds of all Asian and South American BCUs
had treaty-RBO scores of zero, and more than 20% of
BCUs in each continent were not covered by high
treaty-RBO scores. The distributions of scores differed
remarkably when represented using area and population
coverage, as shown in Figures 2b and 2c. Nearly all of the
population and area in North America are covered by
high treaty-RBO scores. Similar compressions of the low
treaty-RBO score shares are seen for all continents except
for Asia, where about one-third of the continent area has
no treaty coverage. Interestingly, nearly one-third of the
population in European and South American trans-
boundary basins is covered by treaty-RBO scores of two
or less. Furthermore, close to 20% of Asia’s transbound-
ary basin population has no treaty-RBO coverage, indi-
cating concentrations of poor treaty-RBO coverage
where many people may be affected.
A number of basins with large disparities among con-
stituent BCUs were found (disparity being defined as the
range between the lowest and highest vulnerability of
BCUs of a particular basin). The reason for disparity is
that not all riparian states may be signatories of a treaty.
The detected disparities are an example of the value of
using a BCU approach instead of the river basin
approach used in most global-scale analyses of trans-
boundary basins. In some cases, a high disparity may
be irrelevant, such as when a certain country comprises
a small portion of a transboundary basin. In other cases
it may reveal that important actors are absent from the
institutions managing a transboundary basin. Of the
eight basins that had a disparity of five, the Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Meghna and Indus basins are particularly
interesting as China is not party to any variability-
related treaties and constitutes significant portions of
Table II. Basin-country units with individual treaty-RBO components by continent (%)
Individual treaty and RBO components
Basin continent Global
Africa Asia Europe N. America S. America Total
At least one water treaty 50 40 69 64 32 52
Allocation 25 25 33 42 14 28
Variability management 20 18 34 15 6 21
Conflict resolution 35 25 49 44 15 35
At least one RBO 40 19 32 56 22 33
Number of BCUs 204 163 192 95 93 747
A single treaty can have multiple components, thus the percentages may exceed 100 for each continent. Each BCU may have one or several
treaties with any of these mechanisms. Such possible repetitions are not represented.
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Figure 1. Global distribution of treaty-RBO scores aggregated to each basin-country unit.
Stefano et al. 9these basins. These two basins together cover 2.768
million km
2 and 872.0 million people. Of the nine
basins that had a disparity of four, the Congo/Zaire,
Danube, Har Us Nur, Niger, Okavango, and Struma
basins stand out because of the significant size or popu-
lation cover of their high-vulnerability constituent
BCUs. These six basins together encompass 253.8 mil-
lion people and 7.477 million km
2. Seven additional
basins had a disparity of three for their constituent
BCUs, while many basins had disparities of one or two.
Hazard: Exposure to hydrologic variability and future
change in variability
Figure 3 shows the global distributions of hazard classes
for present and future. For present hazard, clear spatial
patterns can be identified, with the highest degree of
variability generally found in transitional climate zones
such as the outer tropics and sub-tropics, while core areas
of the polar and tropical climate regions experience low
variability. Africa stands out as the continent with the
largest share of exposure to high hazard, since it hosts
66% of all BCUs and 97% of the population found in
this class globally.
The majority of BCUs is predicted to experience
increases in runoff variability by 2050. In total, 110
BCUs increase from medium present hazard to high
future hazard. This means that the total share of BCUs
in the highest hazard level increases from 8.7% in the
present to 23.4% by 2050. The changes by continent are
fairly even and Africa still stands out with high hazard
levels. In terms of population exposure to hazard, at pres-
ent, nearly half the world’s transboundary population is
in the lowest hazard level, but in the future, only 30% is
projected to be in the lowest hazard level, while 62% will
be in the medium hazard level. The share of the world’s
population found in the highest hazard level increases
from presently 3% to 8% in the future.
Potential risk: Combining treaty and RBO capacity with
exposure to variability
Table III displays the count of BCUs in each combina-
tion of vulnerability and hazard classes. Of particular
interest are the cases where a high degree of hazard from
exposure to variability is coupled with high vulnerability
in the institutional regime (gray shading in Table III).
There were 41 BCUs (distributed in 24 international
basins that, together, host 332 million people) at high
risk under present variability conditions, while 94 BCUs
are at high risk when incorporating future variability
(encompassing 56 million inhabitants – 2% of the
world’s transboundary population – in 61 international
basins that, together, cover 415 million inhabitants).
Since we did not simulate possible changes in institu-
tional arrangements, changes in risk between the present
and 2050 are solely due to climate-change induced shifts
in runoff variability.
There were clear spatial concentrations of BCUs at
highest risk for the present period. Out of a total of 41
high-risk BCUs, 25 were located in Africa (primarily in
northern and sub-Saharan Africa), seven were in Asia
(primarily in the Middle East and south-central Asia),
and nine were found in South America (primarily small
basins along the Andeans). Conversely, the lowest-risk
BCUs were found primarily in western and central Eur-
ope, along the USA–Canada border and in Southeast
Asia.
The distributionofpotentialrisk by 2050showssignif-
icant concentrations of BCUs at the highest risk in
Africa (46 BCUs). African BCUs with over 1 million
people that move to the highest risk class include: Ethio-
pia’s shares of the Awash and Lake Turkana basins,
which together account for 31 million people, the Mor-
occan portion of the Dra (1.07 million people), and the
Zimbabwean portion of the Sabi (2.89 million people).
While for the present period high risk in Asia was con-
centrated entirely in the Middle East, by 2050 several
basins in Central Asia are at high risk, such as the
Kura-Araks basin between Georgia and Turkey (3.43
million). Seven European basins, mostly in central and
eastern Europe, are in the highest risk level by 2050.
Beyond these, many small Central American basins are
found to be at high risk in the future, as well as the Cat-
atumbo basin in South America, shared between
Columbia and Venezuela (1.26 million people).
The last step of our study identified high-risk units
that merit further study: 24 BCUs, distributed in 14
transboundary basins, encompassing 505,000 km
2 and
11.91 million people (Table IV). A third of the basins
identified have all constituent BCUs in the highest risk
group, indicating that there is a significant risk of
basin-wide impacts from climate change.
The picture portrayed by these data is two-fold. First,
there are those well-known basins that are currently at
high risk, such as the Congo/Zaire, the Niger, and Lake
Chad. Secondly, there are basins with a present medium
variability that are projected to experience substantial
increases in variability, such as the Catatumbo basin
shared by Venezuela and Colombia. Some of the BCUs
in this last group have very high population densities,
such as the Turkish portion of the Asi/Orontes (101 peo-
ple/km
2), which could exacerbate the human impacts of
10 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 00(0)climate change. It is interesting to note that, with two
exceptions, all the basins identified which merit further
studyduetopresentvariability(eightintotal)areinAfrica.
Conversely, by 2050, only half of the basins identified are
inAfrica,therestbeingdistributedbetweenLatinAmerica
and Eastern Europe/Western Asia.
Discussion and conclusions
International water agreements and RBOs are considered
important instruments for dealing with changes in
shared basins. Beyond their mere existence, the make-
up and design of treaties, RBOs, and related provisions
Figure 3. Global distribution of basin-country units in present and future hazard classes.
Stefano et al. 11are anticipated to be particularly important in assuaging
potential interstate conflict or country grievances, which
may be caused by an increase in interannual water varia-
bility due to climate change.
The data analysis revealed marked differences
between regions in the frequency of occurrence of cer-
tain mechanisms, particularly for allocation and varia-
bility mechanisms, and for the presence of RBOs.
Gaps in the institutional coverage of population and
area of transboundary basins should be further ana-
lyzed as they could reveal a potential institutional
weakness leading to hydropolitical stress in ill-
equipped transboundary areas. A number of basins
had large disparities among constituent BCUs in their
treaty and RBO coverage, demonstrating the value of
using a BCU approach and flagging basins where
institutional unbalance in the relationships among
riparian countries could seriously hamper dialogue
and management at the river basin scale.
BCUs in the highest potential risk class under cur-
rent variability conditions are clearly spatially concen-
trated in northern and sub-Saharan Africa, pointing to
the need to focus on those two regions to assuage pos-
sible tensions related to variability. Interestingly, other
basins where transboundary disputes are frequent (e.g.
Indus, Ganges, Mekong) did not stand out in our
analysis for present variability, suggesting that other
causes can be behind water-related tensions. BCUs
in the highest level of risk due to variability change
by 2050 were more spatially dispersed than in the
present.
Fourteen basins were identified as particularly inter-
esting for further study based on their high level of
potential risk and their relevance in terms of population,
area, runoff discharge, and intensity of water use. It is
interesting to note that, with two exceptions, all the
basins identified which merit further study due to pres-
ent variability are in Africa, suggesting that improving
the transboundary institutional resilience to water varia-
bility should be a priority for the involved countries and
the international community. In contrast to the present
situation, by 2050 only half of the basins identified are in
Africa, the rest being distributed between Latin America
and Eastern Europe/Western Asia. With all the caveats
related to the precision of future runoff projections (see
below), this distribution of basins suggests that some of
the potentially large impacts of climate change are pro-
jected to occur away from those areas currently under
scrutiny. Determining where institution-building should
be focused using only historic regimes ofvariability could
miss those areas with the greatest need for increased resi-
lience in their institutional systems to absorb or adapt to
change in the hydrologic system. Because of this range in
our findings, it is critical for the water resources research
and policy community to broaden its focus to include
also basins traditionally outside the scope of concern to
adequately address the human and institutional impacts
of climate change. There are additional basins that no
doubt would prove interesting and in need of further
study, but our study provides a starting point for under-
standing what constitutes risk both now and in the
future, and what might serve to ameliorate that risk.
In order to better understand the implications of our
findings, we should mention some caveats based on the
data used. The modeled runoff (derived from World
Bank, 2009) represents natural conditions and does not
Table III. Vulnerability of BCUs and population, present and future hazards
Vulnerability level (no. of BCUs)
Present hazard level Future hazard level
High Medium Low High Medium Low Total BCUs
High 41 199 146 94 174 118 386
Medium 9 113 51 46 93 34 173
Low 15 111 50 35 93 48 176
Total BCUs 65 423 247 175 360 200 735
Vulnerability level (% of population) Total population
(in millions)
High 0.27 7.78 7.99 2.05 6.77 7.23 441
Medium 0.38 8.51 6.29 1.92 7.75 5.51 417
Low 2.37 31.55 34.86 4.25 47.07 17.46 1890
Total population
(in millions)
83 1315 1350 226 1693 8309 2748
Highest risk categories shaded in gray.
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.take into account river flow as altered by human use and
physical infrastructure such as dams. The chosen indica-
tor, the runoff coefficient of variation, did not take into
account seasonal variability or extreme events, which
may also pose critical challenges to basin riparians. More-
over, BCUs were treated as unconnected units
and, consequently, the extent to which high variability
changes in one BCU may increase pressure on the water
resources of other BCUs in that basin was not consid-
ered. In terms of institutional capacity, we argue that
water variability may lead to tension and conflict
between states and that institutional stipulations and
RBOs can potentially assuage such potential tensions.
Although we considered and investigated an impor-
tant array of institutional stipulations, we recognize
that other stipulations exist such as non-water lin-
kages, which likewise deserve scrutiny. Additionally,
the textual analysis of the treaties limited our analysis
to a binary absence/presence of stipulations rather
than considering their overall quality. Similarly, the
level of treaty implementation and treaty equity need
to be included in future research. We assumed that
the treaty and river basin organization landscape
would not change over time, which may not necessa-
rily be the case. Nonetheless, this assumption allowed
us to explore what the existing institutional arena
today would look like projected into a future affected
by climate change. While this analysis did not empiri-
cally and quantitatively estimate or measure how par-
ticular contextual factors may directly affect the
relationship between treaty-RBO capacity and resili-
ence to variability, it does provide motivation for such
future work. Future large-N investigations can thus
utilize the rich hydropolitics literature that has consid-
ered factors such as militarized interaction, power dis-
parities, regime type, level of interdependence, and
geography (Gleditsch et al., 2006; Lowi, 1993; Broch-
mann & Hensel, 2009; Toset, Gleditsch & Hegre,
2000). Further work can also be done on individual
basins or regions (as has already been accomplished in
varying capacities by Goulden, Conway & Persechino,
2009; Conway, 2005; Fischhendler, 2004).
In conclusion, this study highlights that the global
distribution of treaties and river basin organizations
is quite varied and reflects a long and complex history
ofdevelopmentinresponsetospecificdemandsonwater
systemsandlargersociopoliticalprocesses.Likewise,the
variability in basin-wide hydrological regimes is
unevenlydistributedinspaceandintersectswithhuman
use and management in both intranational and interna-
tional settings. Global climate change adds another
l a y e rt ot h i sa l r e a d yc o m p l e xp i c t u r e .U n d e r s t a n d i n g
when and where to target capacity-building for greater
resilience to change is critical. This study represents a
step toward facilitating these efforts with the goal of
motivating further qualitative and quantitative
research into the relationship between hydrological
variability regimes and institutional capacity for
accommodating variability.
Replication data
The dataset, codebook, and do-files for the empirical analysis
in this article can be found at http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets.
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